Introduction
Law is a terribly derivative discipline. That proposition shouldn't surprise most readers. Law serves many masters: economics (privilege and class structures); politics (maintaining and disrupting the status quo); epistemology (belief in cold, hard facts or subjectivism); religion (for some, as its prior, moral underpinning; for others, a sacred domain that ought to remain distinct from the profane); language and culture (the contention that a nation must reflect the traditions of a relatively homogeneous volk), and even metaphysics (some who believe that all persons are causally free to do as they wish, and others who contend that the various communities into which we are born largely determine how we go about pursuing a life worth valuing.) Oh, and let me not forget the social contract tradition that stretches from Locke to Rawls to our own Constitution: that the law secures its languages, and (ii) operate on a daily basis according to far more numerous and complex visions of the good) requires a significant amount of heavy lifting, and (c) that the basic law, even with all the laws and judgments designed to give it effect, cannot rectify all the wrongs of the past nor provide all the material and immaterial goods learners require in order to pursue lives worth valuing.
But this article does not focus on the degree to which our nascent democracy has succeeded or failed to meet the lofty aspirations of our Constitution. It has a far more narrow focus. It suggests, and hopefully shows, that the Constitutional Court has achieved something rather remarkable in its education jurisprudence. In
addressing concerns about what constitutions in non-North Atlantic democracies can do, it has crafted a body of law that recognises the plurality of traditions to which our education law must speak. In so doing, it has identified a golden thread that ties all of its education judgments together: a commitment to pluralism that opens all school doors to all learners and attempts to start us down the long, arduous path of learning to live with one another.
This article takes the following form. Section 2 sets out the relevant extant constitutional doctrine on learners' rights. Section 3 reveals the delicate doctrinal thread of pluralism that runs through the Constitutional Court's judgments and assesses the manner in which it has transformed, quite modestly, the nature of tuition in our heterogeneous classrooms.
Learners' rights and doctrinal analysis

"On your own dime": The difference between maintaining cultures, languages and religions in public schools as against private schools
Section 29(3) of the Constitution permits linguistically and culturally restrictive admissions policies at independent schools so long as these policies do not discriminate, intentionally, upon the basis of race. The Constitutional Court, in Gauteng School Education Bill, made it quite clear that comprehensive visions of the good are more appropriately accommodated in private schools and not in our public schools. 2 As
Kriegler J notes in Gauteng School Education Bill, s 32(c) of the Interim Constitution (now s 29(3) of the Constitution) and then extant national and provincial education legislation collectively constitute a bulwark against the swamping of any minority's common culture, language or religion. For as long as a minority actually guards its common heritage, for so long will it be its inalienable right to establish educational institutions for the preservation of its culture, language or religion … There are, however, two important qualifications. Firstly … there must be no discrimination on the ground of race … The Constitution protects diversity, not racial discrimination. Secondly… [the Constitution] … keeps the door open for those for whom the State's educational institutions are considered inadequate as far as common culture, language or religion is concerned. They are at liberty harmoniously to preserve the heritage of their fathers for their children. But there is a price, namely that such a population group will have to dig into its own pocket.
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While sympathetic to the belief that communities bound by common culture, language or religion are an important source of meaning for most South Africans, Justice Kriegler makes it clear that the post-apartheid state can no longer support public institutions that privilege one way of being in the world over another. The Constitution's answer to those parents who wish to school their children in the language, culture or religion of their choice is pretty straightforward: you may "dig into your own pocket" and build the "independent school" on your own time. 4
'Spare the Rod': Discipline in faith-based Independent Schools
In Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education, the Constitutional Court was seized with the question as to whether or not corporal punishment in a private faithbased school could be used as a method of discipline. court-imposed whipping impairs the right to dignity of minors. 6 The Christian Education
Court extended the line of reasoning in Williams and held that although the applicants had correctly averred that the prevention of corporal punishment in faith-based independent schools was a prima facie infringement of their rights to religious freedom (s 15) and religious practice (s 31), the infringements were both reasonable and justifiable.
The judgment contains valuable language about how our equality jurisprudence tolerates legal and cultural asymmetries. The essence of equality under the South African Constitution, so says the judgment, is that it does not require that we treat everyone the same way, but that we treat everyone with equal concern and respect. 7
And that's just a fancy way of saying that we need not all act the same way in order to enjoy the benefits -ie, religious, cultural, ethnic and associational -vouchsafed by a liberal constitution.
The Christian Education Court, however, does not extend the benefit of this understanding of equality to the use of corporal punishment in religious or faith-based independent schools. A commitment to pluralism does mean that "anything goes". The judgment assumes that for the purposes of analysing the constitutionality of s 10 of the South African Schools Act 8 -which bars the use of corporal punishment by teachersss 15 and 31 of the Constitution have been infringed. Upon moving to the limitations analysis under s 36, the Christian Education Court explains why the state is justified in barring corporal punishment in religious independents schools and why the court will not craft an exemption for such punishment.
Some readers might view this outcome as inconsistent with overcoming the Habermasian problem. That conclusion would be far too hasty. In our new pluralist order, it is perfectly reasonable to override religious dictates and to bar the corporal punishment of children in schools of any kind. First, corporal punishment impairs a child's right to dignity in terms of s 10 of the Constitution. Second, it reflects an invasion of bodily integrity in terms of the right to freedom and security of the person in terms of 6 1995 3 SA 632(CC), 1995 7 BCLR (CC).
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Id para 42.
s 12 of the Constitution. Third, by allowing teachers (known personally to students) to mete out punishment, it manifestly breaches a child's right in terms of s 28(1)(d) of the Constitution "to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation".
Finally, children are in no position to determine the desirability of a set of religious practices that may result in harm to themselves.
A constitutional commitment to pluralism only requires that we take other "ways of being in the world" seriously. 9 An appreciation of our differences -raised by Justice Ours is not the only country that has a pluralist legal system in the sense of common, statutory and indigenous law. Other African countries that face the same problem have opted not for replacing indigenous law with common law or statutory laws. Instead, they have accepted that indigenous law is part of their laws and have sought to regulate the circumstances where it is applicable. In my view this approach reflects recognition of the constitutional right of those communities that live by and are governed by indigenous law. … It is a recognition of our diversity, which is an important feature of our constitutional democracy.
[I]n accommodating different systems of law in order to ensure that the most vulnerable are treated fairly … [t]he choice of law mechanism must be informed by the need to: (a) respect the right of communities to observe cultures and customs which they hold dear; (b) preserve indigenous law subject to the Constitution; and (c) protect vulnerable members of the family. Id paras 235-238. The Fourie Court captures much of what is at stake in matters in which traditional forms of private ordering and the novel social formations apparently required by our basic law are at odds: A democratic, universalistic, caring and aspirationally egalitarian society embraces everyone and accepts people for who they are. At the very least, it affirms that difference should not be the basis for exclusion, marginalisation and stigma. … The acknowledgment and acceptance of difference is Whether or not a child receives an education at a religiously-inflected public school, a faith-based independent school, or at home according to religious dictates, the best interests of the child remain paramount and preclude the use of corporal punishment to maintain order. If, however, we wish to recognise Christian Education as a victory for pluralism, then a more charitable reading must be offered. Having previously addressed corporal punishment in public schools in Williams, the Christian Education Court extends its reasoning to corporal punishment in private schools. Whether home-schooling would be subject to the same dictates and a comparable outcome was not placed before the Court. Courts -especially apex courts -must do more than simply adjudicate one case at a time. 13 But we should not expect such courts to provide a theory of everything in every decision. The trajectory of the Christian Education Court's reasoning is clear enough. Moreover, should they ever be asked to engage discipline and homeschooling, their own judgments, the countervailing rights in the Constitution and particularly important in our country where for centuries group membership based on supposed biological characteristics such as skin colour has been the express basis of advantage and disadvantage. South Africans come in all shapes and sizes. The development of an active rather than a purely formal sense of enjoying a common citizenship depends on recognising and accepting people with all their differences, as they are. The Constitution thus acknowledges the variability of human beings …., affirms the right to be different, and celebrates the diversity of the nation. Accordingly, what is at stake is not simply a question of removing an injustice experienced by a particular section of the community. At issue is a need to affirm the very character of our society as one based on tolerance and mutual respect. The test of tolerance is not how one finds space for people with whom, and practices with which, one feels comfortable, but how one accommodates the expression of what is discomfiting.
Minister of Home Affairs Sunstein One Case at a Time (1996) .
The space for cultural autonomy
In KwaZulu-Natal MEC for Education v Pillay, the Constitutional Court had to decide if a Hindu learner was entitled to wear a nose stud to school as an expression of her Tamil culture and Hindu religion. 14 The school had refused to permit her to wear the stud on the grounds that the wearing of the stud did not fall within the core belief set of the religion. The Constitutional Court held that the "norm embodied by the Code is not neutral, but enforces mainstream and historically privileged forms of adornment, such as ear studs which also involve the piercing of a body part, at the expense of minority and historically excluded forms". Chief Justice Langa found, in addition, that voluntary religious and cultural practices were entitled to the same protection as obligatory practices. While recognising the importance of codes of conduct and the need to ensure discipline, Chief Justice Langa concluded that a mere appeal to uniformity was insufficient grounds to refuse a learner's request for an exemption from a code:
[I]f there are other learners who hitherto were afraid to express their religions or cultures and who will now be encouraged to do so, that is something to be celebrated, not feared. As a general rule, the more learners feel free to express their religions and cultures in school, the closer we will come to the society envisaged in the Constitution. The display of religion and culture in public is not a "parade of horribles" but a pageant of diversity which will enrich our schools and in turn our country.
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A school that wishes to enforce a code of conduct under the kind of circumstances that brought Ms Pillay to court will have to show that a particular exemption is more likely than not to cause a palpable disruption to school activities. Given the absence of any such evidence, the Court found that the learner ought to have been granted an In Antonie v Governing Body, Settlers High School, a learner had been found guilty of "serious misconduct" for attending school with dreadlocks and a cap she deemed to be essential parts of the practice of her Rastafarian faith. 2002 4 SA 738 (C). In the High Court, Van Zyl J held that codes of conduct should not be rigidly enforced. They must instead be read in "a spirit of mutual respect, reconciliation and tolerance. The mutual respect, in turn, must be directed at understanding and protecting, rather than rejecting and infringing, the inherent dignity, convictions and traditions of the offender". Id para 17. The student's conduct was ultimately held to fall well short of the definition of "serious misconduct", and the High Court set aside the School Governing Body's decision. The Schools Act envisages that public schools are run by a three-tier partnership consisting of: (i) national government; (ii) provincial government; and (iii) the parents of the learners and the members of the community in which the school is located. …[T]he principles that have emerged from the case law can be set out as follows: (a) Where the Schools Act empowers a governing body to determine policy in relation to a particular aspect of school functioning, a head of department or other government functionary cannot simply override the policy adopted or act contrary to it. … But this does not mean that the school governing body's powers are unfettered, that the relevant policy is immune to intervention, or that the policy inflexibly binds other decision-makers in all circumstances. (b) Rather, a functionary may intervene in a school governing body's policy-making role or depart from a school governing body's policy, but only where that functionary is entitled to do so in terms of powers afforded to it by the Schools Act or other relevant legislation. This is an essential element of the rule of law. (c) Where it is necessary for a properly empowered functionary to intervene in a policy-making function of the governing body…, then the functionary must act reasonably and procedurally fairly. In deciding that the "minority" students must be accommodated, the Laerskool Middelburg court correctly concludes that the right to a single-medium public educational institution is clearly subordinate to the right which every South African has to education in a similar institution and that such institutions might require the sharing of educational facilities by different cultural communities.
Chief Justice Moseneke's opinion also makes transparent the Court's lack of patience with Hoërskool Ermelo's intransigence with respect to language policy and to the admission of black students who wish to be taught in English:
The case arises in the context of continuing deep inequality in our educational system, a painful legacy of our apartheid history. The school system in Ermelo illustrates the disparities sharply. The learners-per-class ratios in Ermelo reveal startling disparities which point to a vast difference in resources and of the quality of education. … [F]ormerly black public schools have been and by and large remain scantily resourced. They were deliberately funded stingily by the apartheid government. Also, they served in the main and were supported by relatively deprived black communities. That is why perhaps the most abiding and debilitating legacy of our past is an unequal distribution of skills and competencies acquired through education … [FC s 29 (2)] is made up of two distinct but mutually reinforcing parts. The first part places an obvious premium on receiving education in a public school in a language of choice [but] … is available only when it is "reasonably practicable". … The second part of s 29(2) of the Constitution protects the right to be taught in the language of one's choice. It is an injunction on the State to consider all reasonable educational alternatives which are not limited to, but include, single-medium institutions. In resorting to an option, such as a single or parallel or dual-medium of instruction, the State must take into account what is fair, feasible and satisfies the need to remedy the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices.
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The Ermelo Court does not close the door on public schools that wish to order themselves along cultural or linguistic lines. However, Ermelo makes plain the proposition that the form of pluralism to which the basic law commits us is fundamentally inconsistent with a school admissions' policy that excludes a
The Laerskool Middelburg court seems to be on far shakier grounds when it suggests that a claim to a single-medium institution amounts to little more than a desire to maintain a degree of emotional, cultural, religious and social-psychological security. This reading trivializes the desire to maintain basic, constitutive attachments and the challenge that dual medium schools pose to the maintenance of order and discipline between learners (and teachers) from different cultural and linguistic communities. It seems clear that the desire to sustain a given culture as it stands is best served by single-medium institutions that reinforce implicitly and expressly the importance of sustaining the integrity of that community. Maintaining the integrity of a community has the natural consequence of maintaining order through shared mores. As a result, the Laerskool Middelburg court must be wrong when it claims that the conversion of a single-medium public institution to a dual-medium school cannot per se diminish the force of each cultural and linguistic community's claim to a school organised around its language and culture. That is exactly what the conversion does. Whether such insularity is good for learners in an open, multicultural and democratic society committed to equality, dignity and freedom is an entirely different matter. See J Jansen Knowledge in the blood: Confronting race and the apartheid past (2009). Jansen is surely correct when he contends that a failure to attempt to understand the many communities oppressed by apartheid and colonial rule will tend only to replicate the oppression in various spaces and do little to advance our commitment to a reasonably egalitarian, pluralist social order. The doors should be opened even if for no other reason than enlightened self-interest. Success in a multicultural, pluralist society now requires getting along and knowing 'the other'.
Ibid at para 58.
significant number of students on the basis of culture or language (or race). Private ordering or group rights under our Constitution have discernible limits that flow from the commitment to pluralism itself.
Language policy in public schools
The 
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A growing body of evidence supports the proposition that a significant percentage of learners who begin their school careers learning in one of the nine non-Afrikaans African languages is in fact not learning in their "mother tongue". Extant research reveals two permutations of this phenomenon. First, a significant portion of African language learners are taught an African language that is not spoken at home. Second, even where learners are, broadly speaking, taught in their home language, the African language of instruction often takes the form of a dialect with which they are not entirely familiar. For example, many learners speak isiMpondo rather than isiXhosa, or SeSothose-Pretoria rather than SeSotho-se-Lebowa. See National Education Evaluation and Development Unit (2013) National Report 2012.
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Aware of this deficit, the Department of Basic Education has shifted the introduction of the first additional language to the first year of schooling. The department reasoned as follows: Children come to school knowing their home language. They can speak it fluently, and already know several thousand words. Learning to read and write in Grade 1 builds on this foundation of oral language. Therefore, it is easier to learn to read and write in your home language. When children start to learn an additional language in Grade 1, they need to build a strong oral foundation. They need to hear lots of simple, spoken English which they can understand from the context. Listening to the teacher read stories from large illustrated books (Big Books) is a good way of doing this as it also supports children's emergent literacy development. Phase teachers that had been trained to teach Afrikaans as a second language. The
African language was often taught by a specialist SGB-paid teacher. Second, the adoption of an African language as a FAL -with its additional two to three hours of weekly instruction -would have staffing consequences and increase overall school expenditure. As matters stood, these quintile 5 schools already possessed the existing resources -books and teachers -to provide instruction in Afrikaans as a second language. Few schools enjoyed comparable resources for African language instruction. Most publishers had never produced systematic materials in African languages for the youngest cohort of second language speakers. 24 Third, many parents expressed anxiety regarding the extremely high demands, and disadvantage, plenty of opportunities to speak the language in simple ways. This provides the foundation for learning to read and write in Grades 2 and 3. In South Africa, many children start using their additional language, English, as the Language of Learning and Teaching (LoLT) in Grade 4. This means that they must reach a high level of competence in English by the end of Grade 3, and they need to be able to read and write well in English. For these reasons, their progress in literacy must be accelerated in Grades 2 and 3. Id. It is accurate to say that (a) almost all former Model C schools in Gauteng (including schools with a majority of black learners), and (b) virtually all schools in Gauteng with English, Afrikaans, Indian and Coloured learner majorities have opted for Afrikaans and English language instruction. The LOLTS survey is but one public source of this data. availability of appropriately trained teachers and administrators, as well as the adequacy of existing textbooks, across all 11 languages. The new policies recognise cognisable, constitutionally-recognised limits on each school's capacity to deliver immediately upon this laudable goal and commitment to pluralism.
Private ordering and public schools
The out, among other things, the steps that she had taken to ensure that the learners' right to a basic education had been secured. The Constitutional Court asked the parties to reach a normatively satisfying and Pareto-optimal settlement in light of the Court's gloss on the constitutional rights and common-law obligations of the parties.
The parties could not meet the Court's desiderata. The result, in the end, was castigation of each and every party to the dispute (save for the learners) and a court order that tracked the content of the original meaningful engagement order (as delineated above). 29 For my purposes, the most compelling feature of the judgment is the Court's recognition that private actors have predominantly negative obligations regarding the basic education of learners at primary and secondary public schools. The Juma Musjid Court's path-breaking finding is that a private party -the Trust -clearly had a negative duty in terms of s 29(1) of the Constitution not to impair the access of learners to public schools. How this judgment serves the ends of pluralism requires some teasing out.
The private trust was clearly interested in using the land and the school for sectarian purposes. That is, they wished to take the school out of the orbit of the public school system. Juma Musjid thus offers rather penetrating insight as to (a) how private parties will be treated with respect to their contributions to, or their interference limits the degree to which public schools can be used to advance the religious, cultural or linguistic interests of learners from one subpublic at the expense of learners from another subpublic. Private religious, cultural or language based schools retain a significant degree of space within which to create a room of and for their own.
Juma Musjid also resonates profoundly with debate surrounding school fees (a matter that has never reached the Constitutional Court because of legislative interventions.) 30 Despite cries for a no-fee education system across the board, the ultimately (c) a commitment to the rule of law that maximally enhances the mutual concern, respect and trust that individuals (and groups) have for one another and which enables them to cooperate in a manner that does not require coercion by the state in order to produce public goods on scale. 33 With respect to the first insight, the South African Constitutional Court quickly recognised that its role was to provide "scaffolding". Such is the learning of the First Certification Judgment. 34 What the Constitutional Court could not do, and no apex court ever does do, was to recast the socio-economic environment that it had inherited in a manner that generated (rather immediately) the social democratic Pluralism lies at the core of Justice Cameron's argument -in Juma Musjid --that a learner's right to a basic education cannot be undermined by a private party's desire to advance the narrow, sectarian interests of a given religious community.
The effect of pluralism on membership and governance in public schools
Taken as a whole, what effect does the Court's commitment to pluralism in its education judgments have on the manner in which our classrooms are constructed?
In the absence of a single tradition from which learners' rights can be drawn, the Constitutional Court has adopted an "open the door" approach. Learners who wish to receive tuition in an official language of their choice must, where it is reasonably practicable to do so, be accommodated. Nor are the majority of learners denied the right to receive tuition in their preferred tongue. Of course, this "open the door" approach places additional burdens on school officials. They must learn to accommodate "differences" -especially differences that have long been repressed.
They must enable learners from a multiplicity of traditions to live with and study with one another. In a nation long governed by apartness, this golden thread of pluralism provides us with an opportunity to do things differently -whether in terms of tuition in a language other than Afrikaans or English, or preventing private parties from using state run schools to advance sectarian interests. The Court is simply opening the door to learners for whom the door has historically been closed.
Will white kids continue to sit with white kids, black kids with black kids, and Indian kids with Indian kids? Of course. Pluralism accommodates cliques. We find comfort in what's common. We seek out succour and solace in what might appear to be a dull sameness. Nowhere, whether in Habermas' Between Facts and Norms, in Judt's ruminations on Belgium, or in the learning to be had from our Constitutional Court, does it say we must all be friends. The Court's commitment to pluralism simply opens public school doors to all learners. The burden that falls on school governing bodies, principals, teachers and other schools officials is to keep them open and create something greater than the sum of the parts of our radically heterogeneous South Africa.
